Placeholder text

Go to cart

Deception and Self-Deception

By Vladimir Krsti¿

Deception and Self-Deception

By Vladimir Krsti¿

0 - Default Title
Description
Received theories of self-deception are problematic. The traditional view, according to which self-deceivers intend to deceive themselves, generates paradoxes: you cannot deceive yourself intentionally because you know your own plans and intentions. Non-traditional views argue that self-deceivers act intentionally but deceive themselves unintentionally or that self-deception is not intentional at all. The non-traditional approaches do not generate paradoxes, but they entail that people can deceive themselves by accident or by mistake, which is controversial. The author argues that a functional analysis of deception solves these problems. On the functional view, a certain thing is deceptive if and only if its function is to mislead; hence, while (self-)deception may but need not be intended, it is never accidental or a mistake. Also, self-deceivers need not benefit from deception and they need not end up with epistemically unjustified beliefs; rather, they must 'not be themselves'. Finally, self-deception need not be adaptive.
Product details
Number of Pages:
80
Release Date:
2025-09-04
Publication Date:
2025-08-11
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Languages:
Original: English
ISBN10:
1009509772
ISBN13:
9781009509770
Weight:
280 g
Height:
157 cm
Width:
235 cm
Thickness:
9 cm
Buy on Amazon
Currently sold out