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A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism
0 - Default Title
Description
Arguing that explanatory uniqueness warrants inference, and exposing flaws in contending philosophical positions that sever explanatory power from epistemic justification, Leplin holds that abductive, or explanatory, inference is as fundamental as enumerative or eliminative inference, and contends that neither induction nor abduction can proceed without the other on pain of generating paradoxes.
Leplin's conception of novelty has two basic components: an independence condition, ensuring that a result novel for a theory have no essential role, even indirectly, in the theory's provenance; and a uniqueness condition, ensuring that no competing theory provides a basis for predicting the same result. Showing that alternative approaches to novelty fall short in both respects, Leplin proceeds to a series of test cases, engaging prominent scientific theories from nineteenth-century accounts of light to modern cosmology in an effort to demonstrate the epistemological superiority of his view.
Ambitious and tightly argued, A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism advances new positions on major topics in philosophy of science and offers a version of realism as original as it is compelling, making it essential reading for philosophers of science, epistemologists, and scholars in science studies.
Product details
Edition:
1
Number of Pages:
220
Release Date:
1997-08-07
Publication Date:
1997-06-01
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
Languages:
Original:
English
ISBN10:
0195113632
ISBN13:
9780195113631
GPSR Manufacturer Reference:
Weight:
515 g
Height:
157 cm
Width:
235 cm
Thickness:
18 cm
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