Placeholder text
The Measure of Mind
0 - Default Title
Description
The Measure of Mind goes on to develop an alternative measurement-theoretic account of propositional attitudes and the sentences by which we attribute them. On this account, the sentences by which we attribute propositional attitudes function semantically like the sentences by which we attribute a quantity of some physical magnitude (e.g., having a mass of 80 kilos). That is, in much the same way that we specify a quantity of some physical magnitude by means of its numerical representative on a measurement scale, we specify propositional attitude of a given type by means of its representative in a linguistically-defined measurement space. Propositional attitudes turn out to be causally efficacious aptitudes for thought and behaviour, not semantically evaluable mental particulars of some sort. Matthews' measurement-theoretic account provides a more plausible view of the explanatorily relevant properties of propositional attitudes, the semantics of propositional attitude attributions, and the role of such attributions in computational cognitive scientific theorizing.
Product details
Edition:
1
Number of Pages:
278
Release Date:
2007-08-23
Publication Date:
2007-06-28
Publisher:
OUP Oxford
Languages:
Original:
English
ISBN10:
0199211256
ISBN13:
9780199211258
GPSR Manufacturer Reference:
Weight:
584 g
Height:
161 cm
Width:
240 cm
Thickness:
20 cm
Currently sold out